Abstract. This paper develops a new framework for combining propositional logics, called "juxtaposition". Several general metalogical theorems are proved concerning the combination of logics by juxtaposition. In particular, it is shown that under reasonable conditions, juxtaposition preserves strong soundness. Under reasonable conditions, the juxtaposition of two consequence relations is a conservative extension of each of them. A general strong completeness result is proved. The paper then examines the philosophically important case of the combination of classical and intuitionist logics. Particular attention is paid to the phenomenon of collapse. It is shown that there are logics with two stocks of classical or intuitionist connectives that do not collapse. Finally, the paper briefly investigates the question of which rules, when added to these logics, lead to collapse. §1. Introduction. Methods of combining logics are of great interest.
§1. Introduction. Methods of combining logics are of great interest. 1 Formal systems that result from the combination of multiple logical systems into a single system have applications in mathematics, linguistics, and computer science. For example, there are many applications for logics with multiple kinds of modal operators -epistemic, temporal, and deontic.
There are also purely philosophical reasons to be interested in the combination of logics. One illustration of this comes from so-called collapse theorems.
Suppose there is a language with two stocks of the usual logical connectives (for propositional or for first-order logic) -∧ 1 and ∧ 2 , ∨ 1 and ∨ 2 , and so on. There is a well-known result which states that given any logic for this language such that each logical constant obeys the usual natural deduction rules (for classical or even for intuitionist logic), sentences that differ only in some or all of their subscripts are intersubstitutable. 2 Corresponding connectives, such as ∧ 1 and ∧ 2 , behave as mere notational variants. In such a logic, if one stock of constants obeys the classical natural deduction rules, so does the other.
This result has been used to argue for several striking philosophical theses. For instance, it has been used to argue that the logical constants in our language This is the penultimate draft of a paper that appears in The Review of Symbolic Logic (2011) 4(4): 1 Methods of combining logics include fibring and its variants, as developed by Gabbay, as well as algebraic fibring and its variants, as developed by A. Sernadas and his collaborators. See Gabbay (1998) and Carnielli et al. (2008) , respectively, for comprehensive overviews of this work. See Caleiro et al. (2005) for a summary of the central results concerning algebraic fibring.
2 See McGee (2000) for proof of this result. See Harris (1982) for a closely related result. The first collapse results of which I am aware appear in Carnap (1943), sections A.7-A.9 . Also see Popper (1948) for the collapse of classical and intuitionist logic.
have unique and determinate extensions. The argument goes as follows: Suppose that one of our logical constants had an indeterminate extension. Then we could precisify the term. We could introduce two (or more) precise terms into our language with distinct extensions. These terms would presumably obey the usual natural deduction rules (understood to apply to the expanded language). But since the terms would have distinct extensions, they would not be intersubstitutable. By the collapse result, however, this is impossible. Therefore, the logical constants in our language must not be indeterminate.
Vann McGee makes use of a related line of thought to argue for striking claims about quantification.
3 He argues that there is a unique determinate domain for the unrestricted universal quantifier. On his view, when metaphysicians intend to be talking about absolutely everything, they succeed in so doing. Disputes in ontology are genuine disputes; when metaphysicians disagree about what exists, they are not simply talking past each other by using "exists" in different ways.
Timothy Williamson uses the collapse result to argue for a claim about the relationship between classical and intuitionist logic.
4 He claims that the collapse result demonstrates that there cannot be two stocks of logical constants -one classical and one intuitionist -with distinct extensions. The classicist and the intuitionist cannot both be right. Either intuitionism is correct and classical logic is incoherent, or (as Williamson suggests) classical logic is correct and the intuitionists fail to recognize certain genuinely valid entailments.
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There are several ways in which the philosophical arguments for these conclusions may be challenged, and there has been some discussion of these issues in the literature.
6 What has not received sufficient attention, however, is the technical situation. It turns out that the technical situation is not as straightforward as has usually been supposed. For example, there are logics with two stocks of connectives that each obey the usual classical theorems and entailments (for the entire language), but in which corresponding constants are not intersubstitutable. There are logics with two stocks of connectives, one obeying the classical theorems and entailments and the other obeying the intuitionist theorems and entailments, but in which corresponding constants are not intersubstitutable.
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The caveat to these results is that the connectives do not obey the usual natural 3 See McGee (2000) . 4 See Williamson (1987) . A similar line of thought is present in Harris (1982) . See Hand (1993) for relevant discussion.
5 Analogous results have also been used to argue for striking philosophical claims about mathematical concepts. For instance, the categoricity of second-order arithmetic -a sort of collapse theorem -has been used to argue that "finite" has a unique determinate extension. The quasi-categoricity of second-order ZF set theory has been used to argue for the claim that we have a unique determinate conception of the sets, at least up to height. See McGee (1997) , Parsons (1990) , and Shapiro (1991) for discussion.
6 See, for example, the postscript to Field (2001) . 7 This result can also be proved using the technique of crypto-fibring. In particular, see Caleiro & Ramos (2007) for proof of this result restricted to the implicational fragments of classical and intuitionist logic. The technique of modulated fibring, as described in Sernadas et al. (2002) , also provides a way to combine classical and intuitionist logics without collapse. However, the resulting logic is not substitution invariant. Also see del Cerro & Herzig (1996) for a non-substitution invariant logic that combines classical and intuitionist logics.
deduction meta-rules in their full generality. 8 The natural deduction rules encode more logical strength than one might have expected. Perhaps surprisingly, the collapse results rely on this extra strength. Thus, the collapse results turn out to be very fragile. Indeed, the issue of when exactly logics collapse turns out to be rather delicate.
The purpose of this paper is two-fold. First, I develop a new framework for combining logical systems, called "juxtaposition". I prove general metalogical results concerning the combination of logics by juxtaposition. Second, I examine the particular case of combining classical and intuitionist logics. I show how the general results can be applied to shed light on the phenomenon of collapse. I demonstrate that the collapse results are much more limited than one might have expected.
The paper will proceed as follows. In the next section, I introduce the general logical apparatus that will be employed. In this paper, I focus on the case of propositional logics. The approach to semantics employed here is broadly algebraic. I consider two semantic frameworks. The first involves sets of logical matrices, algebras with an arbitrary set of designated values. The second, more interesting, framework involves sets of unital matrices, algebras with a single designated value.
9 In section three, I present the main constructions for combining ("juxtaposing") logical systems. Juxtaposing consequence relations is straightforward -the juxtaposition of two consequence relations is the least consequence relation that extends the original consequence relations. (In this paper, consequence relations are required to obey the usual structural rules and to be substitution invariant.) The juxtaposition of two algebraic structures is only slightly more complicated. A juxtaposed model is an ordered pair of models, each of which is based on the respective algebraic structure. There are two modifications to this basic idea that are needed to get the semantics to work. First, each of the two models must provide semantic values for sentences of the entire language. Therefore, each model treats sentences with main connectives governed by the other logic as though they were additional sentence symbols. Second, the two models must agree on which sentences get assigned designated values. In this way, juxtaposed models must be "coherent".
In section four, I compare juxtaposition to two other methods of combining logics -algebraic fibring and modulated fibring. Section five is devoted to presenting basic metalogical results concerning juxtaposition. In particular, I show that under reasonable conditions, juxtaposition preserves strong soundness. I show that under reasonable conditions, juxtaposition preserves consistency. I also show that under reasonable conditions, the juxtaposition of two consequence relations is a strong conservative extension of the original relations. In section six, I turn to strong completeness. In this section, I present direct proofs of 8 A meta-rule is a rule that governs relations among entailments but do not themselves state entailments. Conditional Introduction, Reasoning by Cases, and Classical Reductio are metarules. Conjunction Introduction and Elimination, Disjunction Elimination, Modus Ponens, and Double Negation Elimination are not meta-rules in this sense.
9 There are other natural approaches to algebraic semantics. For example, we could make use of classes of logical matrices where the designated values can be characterized by a set of equations. See Blok & Pigozzi (1989) . strong completeness that apply in a wide range of cases. Indeed, I provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the case where the two stocks of connectives are disjoint. Finally, in section seven, I turn to the philosophically important case of combining classical and intuitionist logics. Applying the general metalogical results, I show that a logic with two stocks of classical connectives is consistent, conservative, and strongly sound and strongly complete with respect to a particular class of juxtaposed structures -the "bi-Boolean" structures. I show that a logic with two stocks of intuitionist connectives is consistent, conservative, and strongly sound and strongly complete with respect to the class of "bi-Heyting" structures.
10 A logic with one stock of intuitionist connectives and one stock of classical connectives is consistent, conservative, and strongly sound and strongly complete with respect to the class of "Heyting-Boolean" structures. I prove that none of these logics collapse. I also investigate the question of which rules (and meta-rules) lead to collapse when added to these logics. §2. Basic Notions.
2.1. Syntax. A language for propositional logic can be specified by a signature and a set of sentence symbols. A signature C = {C n } n∈N is an indexed family of sets over the natural numbers.
11 For each n ∈ N, C n is the (possibly empty) set of connectives of arity n. A set of sentence symbols, P , is a non-empty set. For convenience, we only work with infinite sets of sentence symbols. To avoid ambiguity, we assume that the elements of each C n and P are not themselves sequences. We also assume that C m and C n are disjoint if m = n and that each C n is disjoint with P . Suppose C and C are two signatures. We say that C and C are disjoint just in case for each n ∈ N, C n and C n are disjoint. Otherwise, we say that C and C overlap. We say that C is a sub-signature of C just in case for each n ∈ N, C n ⊆ C n . Given a signature C and a set of sentence symbols P , the set of sentences generated by C and P , Sent(C, P ), is inductively defined to be the least set such that:
We write α, β, γ, and δ (sometimes with superscripts) to stand for sentences.
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We write Γ and ∆ to stand for sets of sentences. We write p, q, and r to stand for sentence symbols. We write α[β/p] to stand for the result of uniformly substituting each occurrence of p in α with β. We write Γ[β/p] to stand for the set {γ[β/p] | γ ∈ Γ}. Let σ be any function from a subset of P to some set. We write α σ to stand for the result of uniformly substituting each occurrence of any p in the domain of σ in α with σ(p). We write Γ σ to stand for the set {γ σ | γ ∈ Γ}.
For ease of comprehension, when displaying sentences in the language of classical propositional logic, we use infix rather than prefix notation.
2.2. Consequence Relations. A consequence relation, , for a set of sentences Sent(C, P ) is a relation holding between subsets of Sent(C, P ) and elements of Sent(C, P ) such that the following conditions obtain for every α, β, Γ, ∆, and p:
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In this paper, we do not require that consequence relations be compact. That is, it need not be the case that if Γ α then there is a finite ∆ ⊆ Γ such that ∆ α.
Suppose C − is a sub-signature of C and P − is a subset of P . Suppose − is a consequence relation for Sent(C − , P − ) and is a consequence relation for Sent(C, P ). We say that extends − just in case for every Γ ⊆ Sent(C
We say that is a strong conservative extension of − just in case for every Γ ⊆ Sent(C − , P − ) and α ∈ Sent(C − , P − ), Γ − α just in case Γ α. Let be a consequence relation for Sent(C, P ). We say that α is deducible from Γ just in case Γ α. We say that α is a theorem of just in case ∅ α. As usual, we write α for ∅ α.
We say that Γ ⊆ Sent(C, P ) is consistent with respect to just in case there is an α ∈ Sent(C, P ) such that Γ α.
14 We say that is consistent just in case there is an α ∈ Sent(C, P ) such that α. We say that is non-trivial just in case there is a non-empty Γ ⊆ Sent(C, P ) and an α ∈ Sent(C, P ) such that Γ α. We say that has no mere followers just in case α whenever Γ α for every non-empty Γ ⊆ Sent(C, P ). 15 We say that has theorems just in case there is at least one theorem of . These notions are related as follows: Any consequence relation that has theorems has no mere followers. Any consistent consequence relation that has no mere followers is non-trivial. Any non-trivial consequence relation is consistent.
2.3. Semantics. The approach to semantics we employ is broadly algebraic. A structure over a signature C is an ordered triple B = B, D, Φ such that B is the carrier set of the structure, D is a non-empty proper subset of B, and for every c ∈ C n , Φ(c) is a function from the n-th Cartesian power of B to B. B is the set of semantic values of B. D is the set of designated values of B. Φ is the denotation function of B. Since D is a non-empty proper subset of B, B must have at least two elements. If D has only a single element, we say that B is a unital structure and we write 1 to stand for the single designated value.
Given a structure B = B, D, Φ and a set of sentence symbols P , a valuation for B and P is a function from P to B.
A model over a signature C and a set of sentence symbols P is an ordered pair M = B, V such that B is a structure over C, and V is a valuation for B and P . We say that the model M is based on the structure B. Given a class of structures B over C, we say that M is based on B just in case M is based on some element of B. If M is based on a unital structure, we call M a unital model.
Suppose M = B, V is a model over C and P based on B = B, D, Φ . For any α ∈ Sent(C, P ), the value of α in M, α M , is recursively defined as follows:
Given a model M, we write M α to mean that α has a designated value in M. For short, we say that M designates the sentence α. This obtains just in case α M ∈ D. We write M Γ to mean that M designates each of the sentences in Γ. This obtains just in case for every γ ∈ Γ, M γ.
If a model M over C and P either designates every element of Sent(C, P ) or designates no element of Sent(C, P ), we say that M is trivial. Otherwise, we say that M is non-trivial. For any structure B over C and any set of sentence symbols P , there is a non-trivial model over C and P based on B.
Given a class of structures B over C, we write B α to mean that α is valid in B. This obtains just in case for every model M over C and P based on B, M α. We write Γ B α to mean that Γ entails α in B. This obtains just in case, for every model M over C and P based on B, if M Γ then M α. 2.4. Soundness and Completeness. Given a consequence relation for the set of sentences Sent(C, P ) and a class of structures B over C, we say that is strongly sound with respect to B just in case for every Γ ⊆ Sent(C, P ) and α ∈ Sent(C, P ), if Γ α then Γ B α. We say that is strongly complete with respect to B just in case for every Γ ⊆ Sent(C, P ) and α ∈ Sent(C, P ), if Γ B α then Γ α. We say that is strongly determined with respect to B just in case for every Γ ⊆ Sent(C, P ) and α ∈ Sent(C, P ), Γ B α just in case Γ α. We say that is strongly sound, strongly complete, or strongly determined (simpliciter) just in case is strongly sound, strongly complete, or strongly determined (respectively) with respect to some non-empty class of structures. We say that is strongly unital sound, strongly unital complete, or strongly unital determined (simpliciter) just in case is strongly sound, strongly complete, or strongly determined (respectively) with respect to some non-empty class of unital structures.
16 Strictly speaking, these definitions require P to be fixed by context. However, whether α is valid in B does not depend on P so long as P contains all of the sentence symbols that occur in α. Similarly, whether Γ entails α in B does not depend on P so long as P contains all of the sentence symbols that occur in Γ and α.
2.5. Known Results. Let be a consequence relation for Sent(C, P ). We say that is left-extensional just in case for every α, β, δ ∈ Sent(C, P ) and p occurring in δ, {α, β, δ[α/p]} δ [β/p] . 17 The following results are known:
Theorem 2.1. is strongly determined just in case is consistent and has no mere followers.
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Theorem 2.2. is strongly unital determined just in case is consistent, has no mere followers, and is left-extensional.
19 §3. Juxtaposition. We consider here the case of combining two logics. It is straightforward to extend the construction to combinations of arbitrarily many logics (indexed by some set). In what follows, we sometimes use i to range over {1, 2}.
3.1. Syntax. Let C 1 and C 2 be two signatures and P 1 and P 2 be two sets of sentence symbols. (Recall that P 1 and P 2 are required to be infinite.) We allow P 1 and P 2 to overlap. We also allow C 1 and C 2 to overlap.
20 For simplicity, we assume that C m 1 and C n 2 are disjoint if m = n. We also assume that each C n i is disjoint with each of P 1 and P 2 .
The juxtaposition of the sets of sentence symbols P 1 and P 2 , P 12 , is P 1 ∪ P 2 . The juxtaposition of the signatures C 1 and C 2 , C 12 , is {C
That is, C 12 is the signature that results from taking the union of each of the sets of connectives of arity n. 21 The set of sentences generated by C 12 and P 12 , Sent(C 12 , P 12 ), is defined just as above. 3.2. Consequence Relations. Let 1 be a consequence relation for Sent(C 1 , P 1 ) and let 2 be a consequence relation for Sent(C 2 , P 2 ). A juxtaposed consequence relation over 1 and 2 is a consequence relation for Sent(C 12 , P 12 ) that extends both 1 and 2 .
It is immediate that if 1 or 2 is non-empty, so is any juxtaposed consequence relation over 1 and 2 . If 1 or 2 has theorems, so does any juxtaposed consequence relation over 1 and 2 . Using Uniform Substitution it is easy to show that if 1 or 2 is inconsistent, so is any juxtaposed consequence relation over 1 and 2 . Similarly, if 1 or 2 is trivial, so is any juxtaposed consequence relation over 1 and 2 .
17 Wójcicki (1988) , page 236, calls this property "strong replacement". I borrow the term "left-extensional" from Humberstone (2011) , section 3.23, who uses it for a slightly different property.
18 See, for example, Observation 3.23.13 in Humberstone (2011) . The core of this result is Theorem 3.1.5 in Wójcicki (1988) . It is originally due to Lindenbaum.
19 See, for example, Theorem 3.23.9 in Humberstone (2011) . The core of this result is Theorem II.1. 2 in Czelakowski (1981) . It is originally due to Suszko. 20 In the literature on fibring, the combination of logics with overlapping signatures is referred to as "constrained" and the combination of logics with disjoint signatures is referred to as "unconstrained".
21 This is essentially the same construction as the categorial fibring of propositional signatures, as described in Sernadas et al. (1999) , page 152.
22 There is an alternative choice we could have made here. We could have defined Sent(C 12 , P 12 ) to disallow sentences with connectives from both signatures. But that would have yielded a much less interesting language.
The juxtaposition of the consequence relations 1 and 2 is the intersection of all juxtaposed consequence relations over 1 and 2 . It is routine to show that the juxtaposition of 1 and 2 is a juxtaposed consequence relation over 1 and 2 . 23 3.3. Semantics. In developing a semantics for juxtaposed consequence relations, one might think that we should base our semantics on classes of unital structures (or classes of structures, more generally) just as above. However, this is not the best approach to take. By Theorem 2.2, a consequence relation is strongly determined with respect to a non-empty class of unital structures only if it is left-extensional. But the juxtaposition of two left-extensional consequence relations need not be left-extensional. Indeed, as we will see below, although the classical consequence relation is left-extensional, the juxtaposition of two copies of the classical consequence relation is not. So, if we would like a strong unital determination result for this consequence relation, we must rely upon a somewhat different semantics.
A juxtaposed structure over the signatures C 1 and C 2 is an ordered pair B 1 , B 2 such that each B i is a structure over C i . If B i is a unital structure, we write 1 i to stand for the designated value of B i . If B 1 and B 2 are unital structures, we say that B 1 , B 2 is a juxtaposed unital structure.
Suppose B 1 is a structure over C 1 and B 2 is a structure over C 2 . Then the juxtaposition of the structures B 1 and B 2 is the ordered pair B 1 , B 2 . Suppose B 1 is a class of structures over C 1 and B 2 is a class of structures over C 2 . Then the juxtaposition of the classes of structures B 1 and B 2 is the Cartesian product
The set of i-atoms contains the elements of Sent(C 12 , P 12 ) that do not have a main connective from C i . For example, if C 1 and C 2 are disjoint then the 1-atoms include the elements of P 12 as well as those sentences with a main connective from C 2 . If C 1 and C 2 overlap then the 1-atoms include the elements of P 12 as well as those sentences with a main connective from C 2 but not from C 1 .
A juxtaposed model over the signatures C 1 and C 2 and the set of sentence symbols P 12 is an ordered quadruple B 1 , V 1 , B 2 , V 2 such that B 1 , B 2 is a juxtaposed structure over C 1 and C 2 , and each V i is a function from the set of i-atoms of Sent(C 12 , P 12 ) to B i . In effect, a juxtaposed model is a pair of models, each of which treats sentences with main connectives not from its signature as if they were additional sentence symbols.
We say that the juxtaposed model B 1 , V 1 , B 2 , V 2 is based on the juxtaposed structure B 1 , B 2 . More generally, we say that a juxtaposed model M 12 is based on the class of juxtaposed structures B 12 just in case M 12 is based on one of the elements of B 12 . If M 12 is based on a juxtaposed unital structure, we say that M 12 is a juxtaposed unital model.
, is recursively defined as follows:
We sometimes omit the M 12 if the relevant juxtaposed model is clear from context.
We say that a juxtaposed model is coherent just in case for every sentence α ∈ Sent(C 12 , P 12 ), α
In other words, α has a designated 1-value just in case it has a designated 2-value. The notion of coherence is needed to provide a sensible definition of designation for juxtaposed models.
Given a coherent juxtaposed model M 12 , we write M 12 α to mean that M 12 designates the sentence α. This obtains just in case α
. We write M 12 Γ to mean that M 12 designates each of the sentences in Γ. This obtains just in case for every γ ∈ Γ, M 12 γ.
If a coherent juxtaposed model M 12 over C 1 , C 2 , and P 12 either designates every element of Sent(C 12 , P 12 ) or designates no element of Sent(C 12 , P 12 ), we say that M 12 is trivial. Otherwise, we say that M 12 is non-trivial. We show below (Proposition 5.2) that if C 1 and C 2 are disjoint then for any structure B 12 over C 1 , C 2 , and any set of sentence symbols P 12 , there is a coherent non-trivial juxtaposed model over C 1 , C 2 , and P 12 based on B 12 .
Given a class of juxtaposed structures B 12 over C 1 and C 2 , we write B12 α to mean that α is valid in B 12 . This obtains just in case for every coherent juxtaposed model M 12 over C 1 , C 2 , and P 12 based on B 12 , M 12 α. We write Γ B12 α to mean that Γ entails α in B 12 . This obtains just in case, for every coherent juxtaposed model M 12 over C 1 , C 2 , and P 12 based on B 12 , if M 12 Γ then M 12 α.
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Notice that this semantics is philosophically very natural. The two models in a coherent juxtaposed model can be thought of as representing speakers of different languages who take on board one another's claims without interpreting them in their home languages.
3.4. Soundness and Completeness. Suppose 12 is a consequence relation for Sent(C 12 , P 12 ), and B 12 is a class of juxtaposed structures over C 1 and C 2 . We say that 12 is strongly sound with respect to B 12 just in case for every Γ ⊆ Sent(C 12 , P 12 ) and α ∈ Sent(C 12 , P 12 ), if Γ 12 α then Γ B12 α. We say that 12 is strongly complete with respect to B 12 just in case for every Γ ⊆ Sent(C 12 , P 12 ) and α ∈ Sent(C 12 , P 12 ), if Γ B12 α then Γ 12 α. We say that 12 is strongly determined with respect to B 12 just in case for every Γ ⊆ Sent(C 12 , P 12 ) and α ∈ Sent(C 12 , P 12 ), Γ B12 α just in case Γ 12 α.
We say that 12 is C 1 , C 2 -strongly sound, C 1 , C 2 -strongly complete, or C 1 , C 2 -strongly determined just in case 12 is strongly sound, strongly complete, or strongly determined (respectively) with respect to some class of juxtaposed structures over C 1 and C 2 that has a coherent non-trivial juxtaposed model based on it. We say that 12 is C 1 , C 2 -strongly unital sound, C 1 , C 2 -strongly unital complete, or C 1 , C 2 -strongly unital determined just in case 12 is strongly sound, strongly complete, or strongly determined (respectively) with respect to some class of juxtaposed unital structures over C 1 and C 2 that has a coherent non-trivial juxtaposed model based on it.
25 §4. Algebraic Fibring and Modulated Fibring. To better understand juxtaposition, it may be helpful to compare it with other methods of combining logics. In this section, I briefly compare juxtaposition with two other such methods -algebraic fibring and modulated fibring.
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The algebraic fibring of two consequence relations is essentially the same as their juxtaposition. The sole difference is that algebraic fibring is applied to Hilbert calculi, which correspond to compact consequence relations. The important differences arise in the semantics.
The semantics for algebraic fibring makes use of partially ordered unital matrices. In the notation of this paper, a partially ordered unital structure is a quadruple B, ≤, {1}, Φ where B, {1}, Φ is a unital structure and ≤ is a partial order on B with the top element 1. The purpose of the partial ordering is to enable one to define two notions of entailment. Given a class of partially ordered unital structures, B, Γ globally entails α in B just in case in every model based on B, if each element of Γ is designated, then so is α. By contrast, Γ locally entails α just in case in every model based on B, the value of each element of Γ is less than or equal to the value of α. For simplicity, however, in what follows, we'll focus on global entailment.
Suppose B = B, ≤, {1}, Φ is a partially ordered unital structure over C. Suppose C is a sub-signature of C. The reduct of B to C is B| C = B, ≤ , {1}, Φ| C , where Φ| C is the restriction of Φ to the connectives from C . Let B 1 be a class of partially ordered unital structures over C 1 and let B 2 be a class of partially ordered unital structures over C 2 . The algebraic fibring of B 1 and B 2 is B 12 = {B | B| C1 ∈ B 1 and B| C2 ∈ B 2 }. This is a very natural construction. The algebraic fibring of two classes of partially ordered unital structures is simply a class of partially ordered unital structures. This is unlike the case of juxtaposition -the juxtaposition of two classes of unital structures is a class of pairs of unital structures.
One weakness of algebraic fibring compared to juxtaposition is that the strong determination theorem is weaker. Consider the following principle: 25 In the case where C 1 and C 2 are disjoint, Proposition 5.2 enables us to simplify these definitions: 12 is C 1 , C 2 -strongly sound, C 1 , C 2 -strongly complete, or C 1 , C 2 -strongly determined just in case 12 is strongly sound, strongly complete, or strongly determined (respectively) with respect to some non-empty class of juxtaposed structures over C 1 and C 2 . (And similarly for the cases of C 1 , C 2 -strong unital soundness, completeness, and determination.) 26 See Carnielli et al. (2008) for a comprehensive overview of these two methods.
Entailment Congruence. If Γ ∪ {α} β and Γ ∪ {β} α then for any δ ∈ Sent(C, P ) and p occurring in δ,
27
(This is a significant strengthening of left-extensionality.) The strong determination result for algebraic fibring relies upon the following basic result: Any consequence relation that has theorems and obeys Entailment Congruence is strongly determined with respect to some class of partially ordered unital structures.
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We say that a consequence relation over Sent(C, P ) has implication → just in case →∈ C 2 and obeys Modus Ponens and Conditional Introduction with respect to →. Given a consequence relation that has implication →, we say that has equivalence ↔ just in case ↔∈ C 2 and obeys the following rules: {α ↔ β} α → β; {α ↔ β} β → α; {α → β, β → α} α ↔ β; and {α ↔ β}
The point of these definitions is that any consequence relation that has implication and equivalence obeys Entailment Congruence. Moreover, if two compact consequence relations each have the very same implication and equivalence then the algebraic fibring of the two consequence relations will have implication and equivalence, too.
The strong determination result for algebraic fibring is as follows: Suppose 1 and 2 are compact consequence relations that have the very same implication and equivalence. Suppose 12 is the algebraic fibring of 1 and 2 . Then 12 is strongly determined with respect to some class of partially ordered unital structures. In particular, 12 is strongly determined with respect to the algebraic fibring of the class of all partially ordered unital structures for 1 and the class of all partially ordered unital structures for 2 .
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This result is significantly weaker than our strong unital determination result below. By Corollary 6.30, if two consequence relations are each consistent and left-extensional and at least one of them has theorems, then their juxtaposition is strongly unital determined. The two consequence relations need not be compact. They need not have overlapping signatures. They need not have implication or equivalence. Indeed, for the result to apply, the juxtaposition of the two consequence relations need not obey Entailment Congruence.
A related issue is that algebraic fibring is not suitable to use in studying the collapse of classical and intuitionist logics.
30 One way to see the problem is in terms of the semantics. The classical consequence relation is strongly determined with respect to the class of all partially ordered unital structures in which the partial ordering corresponds to a Boolean algebra. The intuitionist consequence relation is strongly determined with respect to the class of all partially ordered unital structures in which the partial ordering corresponds to a Heyting algebra. The algebraic fibring of these two classes of partially ordered unital structures is a class of partially ordered unital structures in which the relevant reducts are 27 This property is called "congruentiality" in Rautenberg (1981) . Consequence relations obeying Entailment Congruence are called "Fregean" in Czelakowski & Pigozzi (2004) and "weakly extensional" in Humberstone (2011), pages 455-456. 28 See Theorem 5.7 in Zanardo et al. (2001) 29 See Theorem 6.7 in Zanardo et al. (2001) and Theorem 3.3.18 in Carnielli et al. (2008) . 30 This is well-known in the literature on fibring and algebraic fibring. See, for instance, Gabbay (1998), page 8.
both Boolean and Heyting algebras. But these must all be Boolean algebras. Thus, the resulting logic ends up behaving purely classically for both stocks of connectives. Indeed, we can show that corresponding connectives become intersubstitutable. The logic collapses.
There is a second way to see the problem. Suppose we have a language with two of each of the usual logical connectives. Suppose ii is the consequence relation for this language that obeys all of the intuitionist theorems and entailments for each stock of connectives. As we will see below, any consequence relation that extends
ii and obeys Entailment Congruence collapses. But the proof of the strong determination result for algebraic fibring crucially depends on the combined logic obeying Entailment Congruence. So there is no way to avoid collapse.
There are methods of combining logics designed to avoid collapse. 31 Perhaps the most well worked out is modulated fibring.
32 The method of combining consequence relations and the method of combining classes of structures are significantly more complicated for modulated fibring than for algebraic fibring or for juxtaposition. But the basic idea is straightforward. A modulated structure is a quadruple B, ≤, {1}, Φ such that B, {1}, Φ is a structure and ≤ is a pre-order with finite meets and top element 1. Each modulated structure B 12 in the modulated fibring B 12 of two classes of modulated structures B 1 and B 2 corresponds to a pair (or pairs) of modulated structures B 1 , B 2 , where B 1 ∈ B 1 and B 2 ∈ B 2 . The semantic values of B 12 are the union of the semantic values of the original two structures. To get the construction to work, however, a restriction has to be imposed on which pairs of modulated structures yield a modulated structure in B 12 . In particular, there must be translations between the semantic values of B 1 and the semantic values of B 2 . These translations are established by something called a bridge, which is provided as an input to the modulated fibring procedure.
The proof theory for modulated fibring relies on a variant of Hilbert calculi called modulated Hilbert calculi. The strong determination result for algebraic fibring relies upon the fact that any modulated Hilbert calculus that has theorems and obeys Entailment Congruence is strongly determined with respect to some class of modulated structures.
33 The strong determination result for modulated fibring is as follows: The modulated fibring (by an adequate bridge) of two modulated Hilbert calculi that each have theorems and obey Entailment Congruence is strongly determined with respect to a class of modulated structures. In particular, it is strongly determined with respect to the modulated fibring (by the bridge) of the class of all modulated structures in which 1 is sound and the class of modulated structures in which 2 is sound.
34 Moreover, a sufficient condition for there being an adequate bridge is that the two consequence relations are for disjoint languages.
35 So there is a strong determination 31 See, for instance, crypto-fibring as defined in Caleiro & Ramos (2007) . result for any pair of modulated Hilbert calculi for disjoint languages which have theorems and obey Entailment Congruence. As before, this result is weaker than the strong determination result for juxtaposition. However, it can be used to combine the classical and intuitionist consequence relations. Moreover, it can be shown that the resulting modulated Hilbert calculus does not collapse. So modulated fibring does provide a way to avoid the collapse of classical and intuitionist logics.
This may sound strange given our result that any consequence relation that extends ii and obeys Entailment Congruence collapses. Modulated fibring is designed to preserve Entailment Congruence. So the modulated fibring of classical and intuitionist logic obeys Entailment Congruence. Why doesn't it collapse?
The answer is that the result of modulated fibring classical and intuitionist logic (over disjoint languages by an adequate bridge) is not a consequence relation in the sense defined above. The resulting relation obeys the usual structural rules, but it is not substitution invariant. A modulated Hilbert calculus comes with a set of "safe substitutions" and is only guaranteed to be substitution invariant with respect to those substitutions. For the particular case of combining classical and intuitionist logic, the relevant set of safe substitutions only permit us to uniformly substitute sentences with a intuitionist main connective (or an intuitionist sentence symbol) into the intuitionist axioms and rules.
Thus, while modulated fibring enables us to combine classical and intuitionist logic without collapse, it does not yield a substitution invariant consequence relation. As we will see below, juxtaposition enables us to combine classical and intuitionist logic in a way that preserves substitution invariance. The cost is that the resulting consequence relation does not obey Entailment Congruence. But that seems to be a smaller cost to bear. §5. Preservation Theorems. In this section, we prove general results about the metalogical properties of juxtaposition. In particular, we show that if the two signatures are disjoint, juxtaposition preserves strong soundness and strong unital soundness. We show that under reasonable conditions, juxtaposition preserves consistency. We also show that under reasonable conditions, the juxtaposition of two consequence relations is a strong conservative extension of each of them.
In what follows, in this section and the next, we assume that C 1 and C 2 are two signatures and C 12 is their juxtaposition. Unless otherwise specified, C 1 and C 2 may overlap. We assume that P 1 and P 2 are sets of sentence symbols and P 12 is their juxtaposition. We assume that 1 is a consequence relation for Sent(C 1 , P 1 ), 2 is a consequence relation for Sent(C 2 , P 2 ), and 12 is a consequence relation for Sent(C 12 , P 12 ). Unless otherwise specified, 12 need not be the juxtaposition of 1 and 2 , or even a juxtaposed consequence relation over 1 and 2 . We also assume that C is a signature, C − is a sub-signature of C, P is a set of sentence symbols, and is a consequence relation for Sent(C, P ).
5.1. The Existence of Coherent Non-Trivial Models. We first provide a simple sufficient condition for when there is a coherent non-trivial juxtaposed model based on a juxtaposed structure. To prove this result, we introduce another semantic notion, that of a juxtaposition of two models.
Suppose M 1 = B 1 , V 1 is a model over C 1 and P 1 and M 2 = B 2 , V 2 is a model over C 2 and P 2 . A juxtaposition of the models M 1 and M 2 is a juxtaposed model, B 1 , V + 1 , B 2 , V + 2 , over C 1 , C 2 , and P 12 such that:
Notice that a juxtaposition of two unital models is a juxtaposed unital model.
A juxtaposition of two models need not be coherent. Given two models, there need not be a coherent juxtaposition of them. If there is a coherent juxtaposition, it need not be unique.
Suppose M 12 is a juxtaposition of M 1 and M 2 . It is routine to show that for
The following lemma provides a simple sufficient condition on when two models have a coherent juxtaposition.
Lemma 5.1. Suppose C 1 and C 2 are disjoint signatures. Suppose M 1 = B 1 , V 1 is a model over C 1 and P 1 and M 2 = B 2 , V 2 is a model over C 2 and P 2 . Then there is a coherent juxtaposition of M 1 and M 2 just in case for every
Now suppose for every p ∈ P 1 ∩ P 2 , M 1 p just in case M 2 p. We show that there is a coherent juxtaposition of M 1 and M 2 .
Let d i be an element of D i and let a i be an element of B i − D i . Let [ ] i be the function from Sent(C 12 , P 12 ) to B i inductively defined as follows:
is a juxtaposition of M 1 and M 2 . We show that for each α ∈ Sent(C 12 , P 12 ), α
Applying this lemma, we have the following result:
Proposition 5.2 (Existence of Non-Trivial Models). Suppose C 1 and C 2 are disjoint signatures. Suppose B 12 = B 1 , B 2 is a juxtaposed structure over C 1 and C 2 . Then there is a coherent non-trivial juxtaposed model over C 1 , C 2 , and P 12 based on B 12 .
Proof. Let V 1 be a function from P 1 to B 1 that maps some element of P 1 to an element of D 1 and some element of P 1 to an element of B 1 − D 1 . Let V 2 be a function from P 2 to B 2 such that for every
It is easy to see that such functions exist. Then M i = B i , V i is a model over C i and P i . For every p ∈ P 1 ∩ P 2 , M 1 p just in case M 2 p. By Lemma 5.1, there is a coherent juxtaposition of M 1 and M 2 . Any juxtaposition of M 1 and M 2 is non-trivial and is based on B 12 . So there is a coherent nontrivial juxtaposed model over C 1 , C 2 , and P 12 based on B 12 .
The restriction to disjoint signatures is important. There are juxtaposed structures that do not have coherent juxtaposed models based on them. For example, let C be a signature with a single unary connective, c. Let B = {0, 1} and D = {1}. Let Φ 1 (c) be the identity mapping on B and let Φ 2 (c) be the function that maps 0 to 1 and 1 to 0. Let B 1 = B, D, Φ 1 and let B 2 = B, D, Φ 2 . It is easy to see that there is no coherent juxtaposed model based on B 1 , B 2 . There are also juxtaposed structures that have only trivial coherent juxtaposed models based on them. For example, let Φ 2 (c) be the function that maps both 0 and 1 to 1. Let B 2 = B, D, Φ 2 . It is easy to see that the only coherent juxtaposed models based on B 1 , B 2 are trivial.
5.2. The Preservation of Strong Soundness. Our next general result concerns the preservation of strong soundness by juxtaposition. We show that if 1 is strongly sound with respect to B 1 and 2 is strongly sound with respect to B 2 then the juxtaposition of 1 and 2 is strongly sound with respect to the juxtaposition of B 1 and B 2 . This result does not require that C 1 and C 2 be disjoint. However, to show that juxtaposition preserves strong soundness or strong unital soundness (simpliciter), we must show that there is a coherent nontrivial juxtaposed model based on B 12 . In the case where C 1 and C 2 are disjoint, we can apply Proposition 5.2.
Lemma 5.3. Suppose B 12 is a class of juxtaposed structures over C 1 and C 2 . Then B12 is a consequence relation for Sent(C 12 , P 12 ).
Proof.
B12 is a relation between subsets of Sent(C 12 , P 12 ) and individual elements of Sent (C 12 , P 12 
Clearly, M 12 is a juxtaposed model based on B 12 . By a simple induction, for any δ ∈ Sent(C 12 , P 12 ), δ
. Since M 12 is coherent, so is M 12 . M 12 designates each element of Γ but does not designate α. Therefore, Γ B12 α.
Lemma 5.4. Suppose B 12 is the juxtaposition of B 1 and
Theorem 5.5 (Preservation of Strong Soundness). Suppose 12 is the juxtaposition of 1 and 2 and B 12 is the juxtaposition of B 1 and B 2 . If 1 is strongly sound with respect to B 1 and 2 is strongly sound with respect to B 2 , then 12 is strongly sound with respect to B 12 .
Proof. By the definition of 12 , it suffices to show that B12 is a consequence relation for Sent(C 12 , P 12 ) such that if Γ 1 α or Γ 2 α then Γ B12 α. By Lemma 5.3, B12 is a consequence relation for Sent(C 12 , P 12 ). By strong sound-
This result is fully general -in particular, it does not require that C 1 and C 2 be disjoint. However, to show that juxtaposition preserves strong soundness or strong unital soundness (simpliciter), we must show that there is a coherent non-trivial juxtaposed model based on B 12 . If C 1 and C 2 are disjoint, we can apply Proposition 5.2. Indeed, if C 1 and C 2 are disjoint, we can show that the juxtaposition of two consequence relations is strongly sound just in case both of them are. To prove this stronger result, we first need to prove a simple lemma.
Lemma 5.6. Suppose C 1 and C 2 are disjoint signatures. Suppose B 12 is the juxtaposition of B 1 and B 2 , each of which is a non-empty class of structures. For
Proof. Suppose Γ ⊆ Sent(C 1 , P 1 ) and α ∈ Sent(C 1 , P 1 ). Suppose Γ B1 α. So there is a model M 1 based on B 1 such that M 1 Γ and M 1 α. Since B 2 is non-empty, there are models based on it. By Lemma 5.1, there is a coherent juxtaposed model M 12 based on B 12 that is the juxtaposition of M 1 with some M 2 based on B 2 . (We must pick M 2 so that it designates the same elements of P 1 ∩ P 2 as M 1 .) So M 12 Γ and M 12 α. Therefore, Γ B12 α. The case where Γ ⊆ Sent(C 2 , P 2 ) and α ∈ Sent(C 2 , P 2 ) is analogous.
Corollary 5.7. Suppose C 1 and C 2 are disjoint signatures. Suppose 12 is the juxtaposition of 1 and 2 . Then:
1. 12 is C 1 , C 2 -strongly sound just in case 1 and 2 are each strongly sound; 2. 12 is C 1 , C 2 -strongly unital sound just in case 1 and 2 are each strongly unital sound.
Proof. Suppose 1 is strongly sound with respect to B 1 and 2 is strongly sound with respect to B 2 , where B 1 and B 2 are non-empty classes of structures. Let B 12 be the juxtaposition of B 1 and B 2 . By Theorem 5.5, 12 is strongly sound with respect to B 12 . Since B 1 and B 2 are non-empty, so is B 12 . By Proposition 5.2, there is a coherent non-trivial juxtaposed model based on B 12 . Therefore, 12 is C 1 , C 2 -strongly sound. Now suppose 12 is strongly sound with respect to B 12 , a non-empty class of structures. Suppose Γ ⊆ Sent(C i , P i ) and α ∈ Sent(C i , P i ). Suppose Γ Bi α. Since B 12 is non-empty, so are B 1 and B 2 . By Lemma 5.6, Γ B12 α. By strong soundness, Γ 12 α. So Γ i α. So i is strongly sound with respect to B i , a non-empty class of structures. Therefore, 1 and 2 are each strongly sound.
B 12 is a class of juxtaposed unital structures just in case B 1 and B 2 are each classes of unital structures. Therefore, 12 is C 1 , C 2 -strongly unital sound just in case 1 and 2 are each strongly unital sound.
5.3. Conservativeness and Consistency. Our next general results concern conservativeness and the preservation of consistency.
We first provide a sufficient condition on when the juxtaposition of two consequence relations is a strong conservative extension of the original relations.
Proposition 5.8. Suppose C 1 and C 2 are disjoint signatures. Suppose 12 is the juxtaposition of 1 and 2 . If 1 and 2 are each strongly determined, then 12 is a strong conservative extension of each of 1 and 2 .
Proof. Suppose Γ ⊆ Sent(C i , P i ) and α ∈ Sent(C i , P i ). Suppose Γ i α. By the definition of 12 , Γ 12 α. Now suppose Γ 12 α. Suppose 1 is strongly determined with respect to B 1 and 2 is strongly determined with respect to B 2 , where B 1 and B 2 are nonempty classes of structures. Let B 12 be the juxtaposition of B 1 and B 2 . By Theorem 5.5, 12 is strongly sound with respect to B 12 . So Γ B12 α. By Lemma 5.6, Γ Bi α. Therefore, by strong completeness, Γ i α.
Conservativeness is closely tied to consistency. If Γ is consistent with respect to some consequence relation, Γ is consistent with respect to any strong conservative extension of it. Thus, we have the following: Proposition 5.9. Suppose C 1 and C 2 are disjoint signatures. Suppose 12 is the juxtaposition of 1 and 2 . Suppose 1 and 2 are each strongly determined. If (for i = 1 or 2) Γ ⊆ Sent(C i , P i ) is consistent with respect to i , then Γ is consistent with respect to 12 .
Combining these results with Theorem 2.1, the following results are immediate:
Theorem 5.10 (Preservation of Consistency). Suppose C 1 and C 2 are disjoint signatures. Suppose each of 1 and 2 is consistent and has no mere followers. Suppose 12 is the juxtaposition of 1 and 2 . Then 12 is consistent. If Γ ⊆ Sent(C i , P i ) is consistent with respect to i , Γ is consistent with respect to 12 .
Theorem 5.11 (Strong Conservativeness). Suppose C 1 and C 2 are disjoint signatures. Suppose each of 1 and 2 is consistent and has no mere followers. Suppose 12 is the juxtaposition of 1 and 2 . Then 12 is a strong conservative extension of each of 1 and 2 .
36 §6. Strong Completeness and Strong Determination. As usual, it is somewhat more difficult to prove completeness results. In this section, we present direct proofs of strong completeness and strong unital completeness that apply in a wide range of cases.
37 The general strategy of proof relies on a modification of the familiar Lindenbaum-Tarski constructions.
38 We first prove a very abstract completeness result that requires there to be suitable equivalence relations with which to build our Lindenbaum-Tarski models. We then investigate when such relations exist.
6.1. The Lindenbaum-Tarski Construction. Let ∼ be an equivalence relation on Sent(C, P ). We say that ∼ is a congruence over C − just in case:
• For every c − ∈ C −n , α 1 , . . . , α n , β ∈ Sent(C, P ), and k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, if
We say that ∼ is compatible with and Γ ⊆ Sent(C, P ) just in case:
• For every α, β ∈ Sent(C, P ), if α ∼ β then Γ α just in case Γ β. We say that ∼ is strongly compatible with and Γ ⊆ Sent(C, P ) just in case ∼ is compatible with and Γ and:
• For every α, β ∈ Sent(C, P ), if both Γ α and Γ β then α ∼ β. We say that ∼ is suitable for C − , , and Γ just in case ∼ is a congruence over C − compatible with and Γ. We say that ∼ is unital suitable for C − , , and Γ just in case ∼ is a congruence over C − strongly compatible with and Γ. We 36 See Cruz-Filipe et al. (2007), Proposition 2.17, for a slightly stronger result. In particular, the juxtaposition of two non-trivial consequence relations over disjoint signatures is a strong conservative extension of each of them. Their proof of this result is purely proof-theoretic, relying on a fixed-point argument.
37 See Zanardo et al. (2001) and Sernadas et al. (2002) for completeness results concerning algebraic fibring and modulated fibring, respectively.
38 See Rasiowa (1974) and Rasiowa & Sikorski (1970) for the application of the LindenbaumTarski method to logics that contain conditionals. See Blok & Pigozzi (1989) for the application of this method in a more general setting. make use of suitable and unital suitable equivalence relations in constructing our Lindenbaum-Tarski models.
Suppose Γ is a non-empty subset of Sent(C 12 , P 12 ) consistent with respect to 12 . Suppose for each i ∈ {1, 2}, ∼ Γ i is an equivalence relation on Sent(C 12 , P 12 ) suitable for C i , 12 , and Γ. We make the following definitions:
12 is the Lindenbaum-Tarski juxtaposed structure for C 1 , C 2 , 12 , and Γ built with ∼ 
, and |α| 1 = |α| 2 for α ∈ Sent(C 12 , P 12 ).
Lemma 6.1. Suppose Γ is a non-empty subset of Sent(C 12 , P 12 ) consistent with respect to 12 . Suppose for each i ∈ {1, 2}, ∼ Γ i is an equivalence relation on Sent(C 12 , P 12 ) suitable for C i , 12 , and Γ. Then M Γ 12 is a juxtaposed model over C 1 , C 2 , and P 12 based on B . Since Γ is consistent with respect to 12 , there is some α ∈ Sent(C 12 , P 12 ) such that Γ 12 α. So |α|
is non-empty: Since Γ is non-empty, there is some γ ∈ Γ. By Identity and Weakening, Γ 12 γ. So |γ| Lemma 6.2. Suppose Γ is a non-empty subset of Sent(C 12 , P 12 ) consistent with respect to 12 . Suppose for each i ∈ {1, 2}, ∼ Γ i is an equivalence relation on Sent(C 12 , P 12 ) suitable for C i , 12 , and Γ. Then: 
Suppose for every i ∈ {1, 2} and every non-empty Γ ⊆ Sent(C 12 , P 12 ) consistent with 12 , ∼ Γ i is an equivalence relation on Sent(C 12 , P 12 ) suitable for C i , 12 , and Γ. We define the following class of juxtaposed structures: Proof. Suppose Γ 12 α. We show Γ B ∼ 12 α. Since 12 has no mere followers, without loss of generality, we can take Γ to be non-empty. (If Γ = ∅, there is a non-empty ∆ ⊆ Sent(C 12 , P 12 ) such that ∆ 12 α. We can take ∆ to be our non-empty set.) By Lemma 6.1, M Proof. For i = 1 and 2, let B 
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To show that 12 is C 1 , C 2 -strongly determined or C 1 , C 2 -strongly unital determined, we need to show that there is a coherent non-trivial juxtaposed model based on B ∼ 12 . We can make use of the following simple result: Proposition 6.6. Suppose 12 has no mere followers. Suppose for every i ∈ {1, 2} and non-empty Γ ⊆ Sent(C 12 , P 12 ) consistent with respect to 12 , ∼ Proof. Since 12 is consistent, for some α ∈ Sent(C 12 , P 12 ), 12 α. Since 12 has no mere followers, for some non-empty Γ ⊆ Sent(C 12 , P 12 ), Γ 12 α. By Lemmas 6.1 and 6.2, M 39 We could make use of B ∼ 1 × B ∼ 2 instead of B ∼ 12 in our results in this section. We focus on B ∼ 12 because it is a slightly more elegant construction.
Notice that in the case that 12 is C 1 , C 2 -strongly sound with respect to B ∼ 12 , we also get the converse of this result: Suppose there is a coherent nontrivial juxtaposed model M 12 based on B ∼ 12 . Since M 12 is non-trivial, for some α ∈ Sent(C 12 , P 12 ), M 12 α. By strong soundness, 12 α. So, 12 is consistent.
Summarizing our results, we have the following:
Theorem 6.7. Suppose 12 has no mere followers. Suppose for every i ∈ {1, 2} and non-empty Γ ⊆ Sent(C 12 , P 12 ) consistent with respect to 12 , ∼ Γ i is an equivalence relation on Sent(C 12 , P 12 ) suitable for C i , 12 , and Γ. Then:
1. 12 is strongly complete with respect to B Lemma 6.8. Suppose Γ ⊆ Sent(C, P ). Then the identity relation on Sent(C, P ) is an equivalence relation on Sent(C, P ) suitable for C − , , and Γ.
Let B = 12 be the Lindenbaum-Tarski class of juxtaposed structures for C 1 , C 2 , and 12 , using the identity relation on Sent(C 12 , P 12 ) for the suitable equivalence relations. Combining Lemma 6.8 with Theorem 6.7, we arrive at the following result:
Proposition 6.9. Suppose 12 has no mere followers. Then: 1. 12 is strongly complete with respect to B The identity relation on Sent(C, P ) is the most fine-grained equivalence relation suitable for C − , , and Γ. We can also characterize the most coarse-grained such relation.
We say that p strictly C − -occurs in δ just in case p does not occur within the scope of any connective not from C − . Suppose Γ ⊆ Sent(C, P ). We define a binary relation on Sent(C, P ) as follows: α, β ∈ Ω Γ C − just in case for every δ ∈ Sent(C, P ) and p that strictly C − -occurs in δ,
This is a modification of the definition of the well-known Leibniz congruence.
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We write α ≡ β (mod Ω Γ C − ) to stand for the claim that α, β ∈ Ω Γ C − .
40 The Leibniz congruence may be defined as follows: α ≡ β (mod ΩΓ) just in case for every δ ∈ Sent(C, P ) and p occurring in δ, Γ δ[α/p] just in case Γ δ[β/p]. See Blok & Pigozzi (1989) for discussion of this congruence.
Lemma 6.10. Suppose Γ ⊆ Sent(C, P ). Then Ω Γ C − is an equivalence relation on Sent(C, P ) suitable for C − , , and Γ.
Proof. Suppose Γ ⊆ Sent(C, P ). Clearly, Ω Γ C − is an equivalence relation on Sent(C, P ). Congruence over C − : Suppose c − ∈ C −n ; α 1 , . . . , α n , β ∈ Sent(C, P ); and k ∈ {1, . . . n}. Suppose δ ∈ Sent(C, P ) and p strictly C − -occurs in δ. Suppose α k ≡ β (mod Ω Γ C − ). Let q be an element of P that does not occur in δ or in α 1 , . . . , α n . Then q strictly
It is straightforward to show that Ω Γ C − is the most coarse-grained equivalence relation on Sent(C, P ) suitable for C − , , and Γ:
Proposition 6.11. Suppose Γ ⊆ Sent(C, P ). Suppose ∼ is an equivalence relation on Sent(C, P ) suitable for C − , , and
Proof. Suppose α ∼ β. Suppose δ ∈ Sent(C, P ) and p strictly C − -occurs in δ. Making use of either Proposition 6.9 or Proposition 6.12, we have the following sufficient condition on C 1 , C 2 -strong determination:
Corollary 6.13. Suppose 12 is the juxtaposition of 1 and 2 , is consistent, and has no mere followers. Then 12 is C 1 , C 2 -strongly determined.
6.3. Strong Unital Determination. Let's now consider the case of unital suitability. We first provide a necessary and sufficient condition for Ω Γ C − to be unital suitable for C − , , and Γ. We say that is C − -left-extensional just in case for every α, β, δ ∈ Sent(C, P ) and p that strictly
. This is a generalization of the definition of left-extensionality presented above: is left-extensional (simpliciter) just in case is C-left-extensional.
Lemma 6.14. is C − -left-extensional just in case for every non-empty Γ ⊆ Sent(C, P ) consistent with respect to , Ω Γ C − is unital suitable for C − , , and Γ Proof. Suppose is C − -left-extensional. Suppose Γ ⊆ Sent(C, P ). By Lemma 6.10, Ω Γ C − is suitable for C − , , and Γ. Suppose Γ α and Γ β. Suppose δ ∈ Sent(C, P ) and p strictly C − -occurs in δ.
is strongly compatible with and Γ. Now suppose for every non-empty Γ ⊆ Sent(C, P ) consistent with respect to , Ω Γ C − is unital suitable for C − , , and Γ. Suppose α, β, δ ∈ Sent(C, P ) and p strictly C − -occurs in δ. 
Combining this lemma with Theorem 6.7, we arrive at the following result:
Proposition 6.15. Suppose 12 has no mere followers. Then B Ω 12 is a class of juxtaposed unital structures just in case 12 is C 1 -and C 2 -left-extensional.
Notice that the claim that 12 is C 1 -and C 2 -left-extensional is weaker than the claim that 12 is left-extensional (simpliciter).
Making use of Propositions 6.12 and 6.15, we have the following sufficient condition on C 1 , C 2 -strong unital determination:
Corollary 6.16. Suppose 12 is the juxtaposition of 1 and 2 , is consistent, has no mere followers, and is C 1 -and C 2 -left-extensional. Then 12 is C 1 , C 2 -strongly unital determined.
6.4. An Improvement. We can improve Corollary 6.16. Suppose ∆ ⊆ Sent(C, P ). We say that is left-extensional over ∆ just in case for every α, β ∈ Sent(C, P ), δ ∈ ∆, and p occurring in δ, {α, β, δ[α/p]} δ[β/p]. This is a different generalization of the notion of left-extensionality than the one presented above.
is left-extensional (simpliciter) just in case is left-extensional over Sent(C, P ). We can improve Corollary 6.16 by showing that if 12 is the juxtaposition of 1 and 2 , is consistent, has no mere followers, and is left-extensional over Sent(C 1 , P 1 ) and over Sent(C 2 , P 2 ), then 12 is C 1 , C 2 -strongly unital determined.
The cost of this improvement is that we must move to a more complicated equivalence relation (for each C − , , and Γ ⊆ Sent(C, P )). In particular, we make use of a modification of (one characterization of) the Suszko congruence. In defining this relation, it turns out to be helpful to work with an expansion of our language.
Let P * be a countably infinite set of sentence symbols disjoint with P . (In what follows, we always choose P * to be disjoint with whatever sets of sentence symbols we are working with.) Let * be the least consequence relation for Sent(C, P ∪ P * ) that extends .
Lemma 6.17. * exists and is a strong conservative extension of .
Proof. Let σ be any function from P * to P . Let Γ σ α just in case Γ σ α σ . It is routine to show that σ is a consequence relation for Sent(C, P ∪ P * ) that extends . It is also routine to show that the intersection of all consequence relations for Sent(C, P ∪ P * ) that extend is itself a consequence relation for Sent(C, P ∪ P * ). Therefore, * exists. Suppose Γ α. Since * extends , Γ * α. Now suppose Γ α. Again let σ be any function from P * to P . It is easy to see that Γ σ α. So Γ * α. Therefore, * is a strong conservative extension of .
Suppose Γ ⊆ Sent(C, P ). We define a binary relation on Sent(C, P ) as follows:
α, β ∈ Σ Γ C − just in case for every δ ∈ Sent(C − , P ∪ P * ) and p occurring in δ,
We write α ≡ β (mod Σ Γ C − ) to stand for the claim that α, β ∈ Σ Γ C − . In this definition, δ is restricted to sentences with connectives from C − . This is what enables us to improve our strong unital determination result. However, this is also what motivates the use of an extra set of sentence symbols. By making use of the elements of P * , we can apply Uniform Substitution to show that Σ Γ C − is a congruence over C − even when Γ contains occurrences of every element in P .
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Lemma 6.18. Suppose Γ ⊆ Sent(C, P ). Then Σ Γ C − is an equivalence relation on Sent(C, P ) suitable for C − , , and Γ.
Proof. Suppose Γ ⊆ Sent(C, P ). Clearly, Σ Γ C − is an equivalence relation on Sent(C, P ). Congruence over C − : Suppose c − ∈ C −n ; α 1 , . . . , α n , β ∈ Sent(C, P ); and k ∈ {1, . . . n}. Suppose α k ≡ β (mod Σ Γ C − ). Suppose δ ∈ Sent(C − , P ∪ P * ) and p occurs in δ. Let p 1 , . . . , p n be distinct elements of P * that do not occur in δ.
There is an alternative approach that we could instead have adopted. The idea is to make use of the following equivalence relation: α, β ∈ Σ Γ C − just in case for every δ ∈ Sent(C − , P ) and p occurring in δ,
. Using Uniform Substitution, we can show that if Γ lacks occurrences of infinitely many elements of P then Σ Γ C − is a congruence over C − . If were to adopt this approach, we would have to modify our definition of the Lindenbaum-Tarski class of juxtaposed structures so that it contains a juxtaposed structure for every non-empty Γ ⊆ Sent(C 12 , P 12 ) consistent with respect to 12 that lacks occurrences of infinitely many elements of P 12 . In effect, we would be working with restrictions of the language rather than an expansion of it.
Compatibility with and Γ: Suppose
That is, Γ ∪ {α} * β. By Lemma 6.17, Γ ∪ {α} β. Similarly, Γ ∪ {β} α. By Cut, Γ α just in case Γ β.
Before we provide conditions for when Σ Γ C − is unital suitable for C − , , and Γ, we first prove two simple results concerning left-extensionality over a set:
Lemma 6.19. Suppose ∆ ⊆ Sent(C, P ). Suppose is left-extensional over ∆. Then any consequence relation that extends is left-extensional over ∆.
Proof. Suppose C is a sub-signature of C + and P is a subset of P + . Suppose + is a consequence relation for Sent(C + , P + ) that extends . Suppose α, β ∈ Sent(C + , P + ); δ ∈ ∆; and p occurs in δ. Let q and r be distinct elements of P that do not occur in δ. Lemma 6.20. Suppose P − is an infinite subset of P . Then is left-extensional over Sent(C − , P ) just in case is left-extensional over Sent(C − , P − ).
Proof. Suppose is left-extensional over Sent(C − , P ). Since Sent(C − , P − ) is a subset of Sent(C − , P ), is left-extensional over Sent(C − , P − ). Now suppose is left-extensional over Sent(C − , P − ). Suppose that δ ∈ Sent(C − , P ); α, β ∈ Sent(C, P ); and p occurs in δ. Let P δ contain those elements of P − P − that occur in δ. Let P * contain those elements of P − that do not occur in α, β, or δ. Let σ be an injective function from P δ to P * . Such a function exists since P δ is finite and P * is infinite. By left-extensionality over Sent(C
Making use of these results, we can prove the following result:
Lemma 6.21. is left-extensional over Sent(C − , P ) just in case for every non-empty Γ ⊆ Sent(C, P ) consistent with respect to , Σ Γ C − is unital suitable for C − , , and Γ.
Proof. Suppose is left-extensional over Sent(C − , P ). Suppose that Γ ⊆ Sent(C, P ). By Lemma 6.18, for every Γ ⊆ Sent(C, P ), Σ Γ C − is suitable for C − , , and Γ. Suppose Γ α and Γ β. Suppose δ ∈ Sent(C − , P ∪ P * ) and p occurs in δ. By Lemma 6.19, * is left-extensional over Sent(C − , P ). By Lemma 6.20,
C − is unital suitable for C − , , and Γ. Now suppose for every non-empty Γ ⊆ Sent(C, P ) consistent with respect to , Σ Γ C − is unital suitable for C − , , and Γ. Suppose α, β ∈ Sent(C, P ); δ ∈ Sent(C − , P ); and p occurs in δ. is a class of juxtaposed unital structures just in case 12 is left-extensional over Sent(C 1 , P 1 ) and over Sent(C 2 , P 2 ).
The following corollary is immediate:
Corollary 6.23. Suppose 12 is the juxtaposition of 1 and 2 , is consistent, has no mere followers, and is left-extensional over Sent(C 1 , P 1 ) and over Sent(C 2 , P 2 ). Then 12 is C 1 , C 2 -strongly unital determined.
Notice that the claim that 12 is left-extensional over Sent(C i , P i ) is weaker than the claim that 12 is C i -left-extensional. Thus, this is a genuine strengthening of Corollary 6.16. 6.5. Necessary Conditions. Corollaries 6.13 and 6.23 provide sufficient conditions on C 1 , C 2 -strong determination and C 1 , C 2 -strong unital determination, respectively. This raises the question of whether these conditions are necessary, too. We can show that they are almost necessary. In particular, non-triviality (and hence, consistency) is necessary for C 1 , C 2 -strong determination. Left-extensionality over Sent(C 1 , P 1 ) and over Sent(C 2 , P 2 ) is necessary for C 1 , C 2 -strong unital determination. However, we cannot show that having no mere followers is a necessary condition on C 1 , C 2 -strong determination. What we can show is that if C 1 and C 2 are disjoint, having no mere followers is a necessary condition.
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Proposition 6.24. 12 is C 1 , C 2 -strongly sound only if 12 is non-trivial.
Proof. Suppose 12 is strongly sound with respect to B 12 , a class of juxtaposed structures over C 1 and C 2 with a coherent non-trivial juxtaposed model 43 We could modify our definitions so that having no mere followers is in general necessary for C 1 , C 2 -strong determination. One way to do so would be to say that 12 is C 1 , C 2 -strongly determined just in case 12 is strongly determined with respect to some class B 12 of juxtaposed structures over C 1 and C 2 such that (i) there is a non-trivial coherent juxtaposed model based on B 12 ; and (ii) if a sentence is invalid in B 12 , then there is a non-trivial coherent juxtaposed model based on B 12 that does not designate the sentence. (We would also have to redefine C 1 , C 2 -strong unital determination in the corresponding way.) This is a natural proposal, since the analogue of condition (ii) is automatically satisfied in the case of ordinary (non-juxtaposed) strong determination. Moreover, since our Lindenbaum-Tarski juxtaposed models are non-trivial, the additional condition would not affect our proofs of C 1 , C 2 -strong determination and C 1 , C 2 -strong unital determination. However, since this alternative definition is somewhat more complicated, we will stick with our original definition.
M 12 based on it. Since M 12 is non-trivial, for some α, β ∈ Sent(C 12 , P 12 ), M 12 β and M 12 α. So {β} B12 α. By soundness, {β} 12 α. So 12 is non-trivial.
It immediately follows that 12 is C 1 , C 2 -strongly sound only if 12 is consistent.
Proposition 6.25. 12 is C 1 , C 2 -strongly complete with respect to a class of juxtaposed unital structures only if 12 is left-extensional over Sent(C 1 , P 1 ) and over Sent(C 2 , P 2 ).
Proof. Suppose 12 is strongly complete with respect to B 12 , a class of juxtaposed unital structures over C 1 and C 2 . Let i = 1 or 2. Suppose δ ∈ Sent(C i , P i ) and α, β ∈ Sent(C 12 , P 12 ). Suppose M 12 is a coherent juxtaposed unital model over C 1 , C 2 , and P 12 based on B 12 such that M 12 α, M 12 β, and
Proposition 6.26. Suppose C 1 and C 2 are disjoint. 12 is C 1 , C 2 -strongly determined with respect to a class of juxtaposed structures only if 12 has no mere followers.
Proof. Suppose 12 is strongly determined with respect to B 12 , a class of juxtaposed structures over C 1 and C 2 . Suppose 12 α. Let p be an element of P 12 that does not occur in α. We show that {p} 12 α.
By completeness, B12 α. So there is a coherent juxtaposed model M 12 = B 1 , V 1 , B 2 , V 2 over C 1 , C 2 , and P 12 based on B 12 such that M 12 α. Let each
Let d i be an element of D i and let a i be an element of B i − D i . Let [ ] i be the function from Sent(C 12 , P 12 ) to B i inductively defined as follows: Combining Corollaries 6.13 and 6.23 with Propositions 6.24, 6.25, and 6.26, we arrive at the following nice result:
Corollary 6.27. Suppose C 1 and C 2 are disjoint. Suppose 12 is the juxtaposition of 1 and 2 . Then:
1. 12 is C 1 , C 2 -strongly determined just in case 12 is consistent and has no mere followers; 2. 12 is C 1 , C 2 -strongly unital determined just in case 12 is consistent, has no mere followers, and is left-extensional over Sent(C 1 , P 1 ) and over Sent(C 2 , P 2 ).
6.6. Juxtaposed Consequence Relations. Our main interest in this paper concerns the combination of logics. A natural question to ask is: What properties of 1 and 2 suffice for a juxtaposed consequence relation over 1 and 2 to be C 1 , C 2 -strongly determined or C 1 , C 2 -strongly unital determined? The results above enable us to provide a fairly comprehensive answer to this question.
We first define a new notion. Suppose α ∈ Sent(C, P ). We say that an occurrence of β in α is a maximal non-C − -occurrence just in case the main connective of β is not from C − and the occurrence is not properly within the scope of any connective not from C − .
Lemma 6.28. Suppose is C − -left-extensional. Then any consequence relation that extends is C − -left-extensional.
Proof. Suppose C is a sub-signature of C + and P is a subset of P + . Suppose + is a consequence relation for Sent(C + , P + ) that extends . Suppose α, β, δ ∈ Sent(C + , P + ) and p strictly C − -occurs in δ. Without loss of generality, we can assume that δ ∈ Sent(C + , P ). (We can use Uniform Substitution to cover the case where it doesn't.) Let δ − be the result of replacing the maximal non-C − -occurrences in δ with distinct elements of P that do not occur in α, β, or δ. Let q and r be distinct elements of P that do not occur in δ − . So δ − ∈ Sent(C, P ) and
Proposition 6.29. Suppose 12 is a juxtaposed consequence relation over 1 and 2 . Suppose at least one of 1 or 2 has theorems. Then:
1. 12 is strongly complete with respect to each of B Proof. If at least one of 1 and 2 has theorems, 12 has theorems, and so 12 has no mere followers. Claims 1-3 then follow from Propositions 6.9, 6.12, and 6.22. If i is left-extensional, then by Lemma 6.28, 12 is C i -leftextensional (and thus, is left-extensional over Sent(C i , P i )). Claim 4 then follows from Propositions 6.15 and 6.22.
Corollary 6.30. Suppose 12 is the juxtaposition of 1 and 2 . Suppose 12 is consistent. Suppose at least one of 1 and 2 has theorems. Then:
1. 12 is C 1 , C 2 -strongly determined; 2. If 1 and 2 are each left-extensional, then 12 is C 1 , C 2 -strongly unital determined.
In the case where C 1 and C 2 are disjoint, we have the following nice results:
Proposition 6.31. Suppose C 1 and C 2 are disjoint. Suppose 12 is the juxtaposition of 1 and 2 . Suppose each of 1 and 2 is consistent and has no mere followers. Suppose at least one of 1 and 2 has theorems. Then:
1. 12 is strongly determined with respect to each of B Proof. By Theorem 5.10, 12 is consistent. If at least one of 1 and 2 has theorems, 12 has theorems, and so 12 has no mere followers. Claims 1-3 then follow from Propositions 6.9, 6.12, and 6.22 If i is left-extensional, then by Lemma 6.28, 12 is C i -left-extensional (and thus, is left-extensional over Sent(C i , P i )). By Theorem 5.11, if 12 is left-extensional over Sent(C i , P i ), then i is left-extensional. Claim 4 then follows from Propositions 6.15 and 6.22.
Corollary 6.32. Suppose C 1 and C 2 are disjoint. Suppose 12 is the juxtaposition of 1 and 2 . Suppose at least one of 1 and 2 has theorems. Then:
1. 12 is C 1 , C 2 -strongly determined just in case each of 1 and 2 is consistent and has no mere followers; 2. 12 is C 1 , C 2 -strongly unital determined just in case each of 1 and 2 is consistent, has no mere followers, and is left-extensional.
Proof. The right-to-left direction of each claim follows from Proposition 6.31. The left-to-right direction follows from Propositions 6.24, 6.25, and 6.26 combined with Theorem 5.11.
Using Theorems 2.1 and 2.2, the following result is immediate:
Corollary 6.33. Suppose C 1 and C 2 are disjoint. Suppose 12 is the juxtaposition of 1 and 2 . Suppose at least one of 1 and 2 has theorems. Then:
1. 12 is C 1 , C 2 -strongly determined just in case each of 1 and 2 is strongly determined; 2. 12 is C 1 , C 2 -strongly unital determined just in case each of 1 and 2 is strongly unital determined.
There is an additional result worth stating. We will make use of this result in our discussion of classical and intuitionist logic below. We say that a class of structures B is full for the consequence relation just in case is strongly sound with respect to B and B contains at least one representative from every isomorphism class of structures for that has a set of semantic values with cardinality at most that of the language of . 44 We say that B is unital full for the consequence relation just in case is strongly unital sound with respect to B and B contains at least one representative from every isomorphism class of unital structures for that has a set of semantic values with cardinality at most that of the language of .
Proposition 6.34. Suppose 12 is the juxtaposition of 1 and 2 and B 12 is the juxtaposition of B 1 and B 2 . Suppose at least one of 1 and 2 has theorems. Then:
1. If B 1 is full for 1 and B 2 is full for 2 , then 12 is strongly determined with respect to B 12 ; 2. If 1 and 2 are each left-extensional, B 1 is unital full for 1 , and B 2 is unital full for 2 , then 12 is strongly determined with respect to B 12 , a class of juxtaposed unital structures.
Proof. Since 1 is strongly sound with respect to B 1 and 2 is strongly sound with respect to B 2 , by Theorem 5.5, 12 is strongly sound with respect to B 12 .
Suppose B 1 is full for 1 and B 2 is full for 2 . By Proposition 6.29, 12 is strongly determined with respect to B Σ 12 . Using fullness, it is routine to show that each element of B Σ 12 is isomorphic to an element of B 1 ×B 2 = B 12 . Therefore, 12 is strongly complete with respect to respect to B 12 . Suppose B 1 is unital full for 1 and B 2 is unital full for 2 . Since 1 and 2 are each left-extensional, by Proposition 6.29, 12 is strongly determined with respect to B Σ 12 , a class of juxtaposed unital structures. Using fullness, it is again routine to show that each element of B Σ 12 is isomorphic to an element of B 12 . So 12 is strongly complete with respect to respect to B 12 . Since B 12 is the juxtaposition of two classes of unital structures, it is a class of juxtaposed unital structures.
6.7. Equivalential Logics. There is an important special case worth discussing. It concerns logics that contain a set of formulas that behave like a generalized biconditional.
Let q and r be distinct elements of P . Suppose Θ ⊆ Sent(C, {q, r}). For simplicity, if θ ∈ Θ, we write θ(α, β) to stand for the result of uniformly substituting each occurrence of q in θ with α and each occurrence of r in θ with β. We write Θ(α, β) to stand for the set {θ(α, β) | θ ∈ Θ}. We write Θ(α, β) to abbreviate the claim that for every θ ∈ Θ, θ(α, β). We write Γ Θ(α, β) to abbreviate the claim that for every θ ∈ Θ, Γ θ(α, β).
We say that Θ is an equivalence set over C − for just in case Θ satisfies the following conditions for every α, β, γ ∈ Sent(C, P ):
There is an additional condition worth stating: Substitution over C − . For every δ ∈ Sent(C, P ) and p that strictly
Proposition 6.35. Suppose Θ satisfies Reflexivity and Congruence over C − . Then Θ satisfies Substitution over C − just in case Θ satisfies Modus Ponens.
Proof. Suppose Θ satisfies Modus Ponens. Suppose δ ∈ Sent(C, P ) and p strictly C − -occurs in δ. Using Reflexivity and Congruence over C − , by induction on the complexity of δ,
We say that Θ is a regular equivalence set over C − for just in case Θ is an equivalence set over C − for that satisfies the following additional condition:
We say that Θ is an equivalence set for just in case Θ is an equivalence set over C for . We say that Θ is a regular equivalence set for just in case Θ is a regular equivalence set over C for . In many familiar logics -including classical and intuitionist logic -the sets {q ↔ r} and {q → r, r → q} are regular equivalence sets.
We say that is equivalential over C − if there is an equivalence set over C − for . We say that is regularly equivalential over C − if there is a regular equivalence set over C − for . We say that is equivalential (simpliciter) just in case is equivalential over C. We say that is regularly equivalential (simpliciter) just in case is regularly equivalential over C.
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It is straightforward to show that if is regularly equivalential over C − , then is C − -left-extensional (and is therefore left-extensional over Sent(C − , P )).
Proposition 6.36. If is regularly equivalential over C − , then is C − -left-extensional.
Proof. Suppose Θ is a regular equivalence set over C − for . Suppose δ ∈ Sent(C, P ) and p strictly C − -occurs in δ. By Proposition 6.35,
Equivalence sets over C − provide simple ways to construct equivalence relations suitable for C − , , and Γ. Suppose Θ ⊆ Sent(C, P ) is an equivalence set over C − for . Suppose Γ ⊆ Sent(C, P ). We define a binary relation on Sent(C, P ) as follows:
We write α ≡ β (mod Θ Γ ) to stand for the claim that α, β ∈ Θ Γ .
Lemma 6.37. Suppose Θ is an equivalence set over C − for . Then for every Γ ⊆ Sent(C, P ), Θ Γ is an equivalence relation on Sent(C, P ) suitable for C − , , and Γ. 45 The notion of an equivalential logic (simpliciter) is originally due to Prucnal & Wroński (1974) . See Czelakowski (1981) for discussion.
Proof. Suppose Γ ⊆ Sent(C, P ). By Reflexivity, Symmetry, Transitivity, Weakening, and Cut, Θ Γ is an equivalence relation on Sent(C, P ). Congruence over C − : Suppose c − ∈ C −n ; α 1 , . . . , α n , β ∈ Sent(C, P ); and
Lemma 6.38. Suppose Θ is an equivalence set over C − for . Then Θ is a regular equivalence set over C − for just in case for every non-empty Γ ⊆ Sent(C, P ) consistent with , Θ Γ is unital suitable for C − , , and Γ.
Proof. Suppose Θ is a regular equivalence set over C − for . Suppose Γ ⊆ Sent(C, P ). Suppose Γ α and Γ β. By Regularity, {α, β} Θ(α, β). By Cut, Γ Θ(α, β). So α ≡ β (mod Θ Γ ). Therefore, Θ Γ is unital suitable for C − , , and Γ. Now suppose for every non-empty Γ ⊆ Sent(C, P ) consistent with , Θ Γ is unital suitable for C − , , and Γ. Suppose α, β ∈ Sent(C, P ). If {α, β} is inconsistent with respect to , {α, β} Θ(α, β). Suppose, then, that {α, β} is consistent with respect to . So Θ {α,β} is unital suitable for C − , , and {α, β}. By Identity and Weakening, {α, β} α and {α, β} β. By strong compatibility with and {α, β}, α ≡ β (mod Θ {α,β} ). So, again, {α, β} Θ(α, β). Therefore, Θ is a regular equivalence set over C − for .
Suppose Θ 1 is an equivalence set over C 1 for 12 and Θ 2 is an equivalence set over C 2 for 12 . Let B
Θ1,Θ2 12
be the Lindenbaum-Tarski class of juxtaposed structures for C 1 , C 2 , and 12 built using the Θ Γ i relations. Any consequence relation that is equivalential over some signature has theorems. Combining this fact with Lemmas 6.37 and 6.38 and Theorem 6.7, we arrive at the following result:
Proposition 6.39. Suppose Θ 1 is an equivalence set over C 1 for 12 and Θ 2 is an equivalence set over C 2 for 12 . Then: is a class of juxtaposed unital structures just in case Θ 1 is a regular equivalence set over C 1 for 12 and Θ 2 is a regular equivalence set over C 2 for 12 .
There is a particularly well-behaved kind of equivalence set over C − . We say that Θ is an internal equivalence set over C − for just in case Θ is an equivalence set over C − for and Θ ⊆ Sent(C − , {q, r}). We say that Θ is an regular internal equivalence set if, in addition, Θ satisfies the Regularity condition. We say that is internally equivalential over C − if there is an internal equivalence set over C − for . We say that is regularly internally equivalential over C − if there is a regular internal equivalence set over C − for . Notice that is equivalential (simpliciter) just in case is internally equivalential over C. is regularly equivalential (simpliciter) just in case is regularly internally equivalential over C.
We first put forward two alternative ways to characterize internal equivalence sets over C − .
Proposition 6.40. Suppose Θ ⊆ Sent(C − , {q, r}). Θ is an internal equivalence set over C − for just in case Θ satisfies Reflexivity, Modus Ponens, and Congruence over C − .
Proof. Suppose Θ satisfies Reflexivity, Modus Ponens, and Congruence over C − . Suppose θ ∈ Θ. Symmetry: Since Θ is an internal equivalence set over
Transitivity: Since Θ is an internal equivalence set over C − for , p strictly
Proposition 6.41. Suppose Θ ⊆ Sent(C − , {q, r}). Θ is an internal equivalence set over C − for just in case Θ satisfies Reflexivity and Substitution over C − .
Proof. Suppose Θ is an internal equivalence set over C − for . Θ satisfies Reflexivity. By Proposition 6.35, Θ satisfies Substitution over C − . Now suppose Θ satisfies Reflexivity and Substitution over C − . Suppose c − ∈ C −n ; α 1 , . . . , α n , β ∈ Sent(C, P ); p is an element of P that does not occur in α 1 , . . . , α n ; and k ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Suppose θ ∈ Θ. Since θ ∈ Sent(C − , {q, r}),
. So Θ satisfies Congruence over C − . By Proposition 6.35, Θ satisfies Modus Ponens. By Proposition 6.40, Θ satisfies Symmetry and Transitivity. Therefore, Θ is an internal equivalence set over C − for .
We next show that any two internal equivalence sets over C − for are interderivable:
Proposition 6.42. Suppose Θ and Θ are both internal equivalence sets over C − for . Then Θ(α, β) Θ (α, β).
Proof. Suppose θ ∈ Θ . Since Θ is an internal equivalence set over C − for ,
It follows from this result that if Θ and Θ are both internal equivalence sets over C − for , then Θ Γ = Θ Γ . (It also follows that if Θ is regular, so is Θ .
Indeed, it is straightforward to show that if is internally equivalential and regularly equivalential, then every internal equivalence relation is regular.) Suppose is internally equivalential over C − . Let Θ Γ C − stand for the unique equivalence relation defined on Sent(C, P ) generated by any of the internal equivalence sets over C − for . We can show that Θ
is the most coarse-grained equivalence relation on Sent(C, P ) suitable for C − , , and Γ.
Lemma 6.43. 1. If Θ is an equivalence set over C − for , then Θ is an equivalence set over C − for any consequence relation that extends ; 2. If Θ is a regular equivalence set over C − for , then Θ is a regular equivalence set over C − for any consequence relation that extends .
Proof. Suppose C is a sub-signature of C + and P is a subset of P + . Suppose + is a consequence relation for Sent(C + , P + ) that extends . Suppose p, q, and r are distinct elements of P . Suppose α, β, γ ∈ Sent(C + , P + ).
. Regularity: By Regularity, {p, q} Θ(p, q). So {p, q} + Θ(p, q). By Uniform Substitution, {α, β} Θ(α, β).
Proposition 6.44. Suppose is internally equivalential over
is the most coarse-grained equivalence relation over Sent(C, P ) suitable for C − , , and Γ.
Proof. Suppose Θ is an internal equivalence set over C − for . We first show that α ≡ β (mod Θ
Let p be an element of P that does not occur in α. Since Θ is an internal equivalence set over
. Suppose δ ∈ Sent(C − , P ∪ P * ) and p occurs in δ. By Lemma 6.43, Θ is an equivalence set over C − for
. Suppose θ ∈ Θ and p ∈ P * . Since Θ is an internal equivalence set over C − for , Γ ∪ θ(p, α) * θ(p, β). By Uniform Substitution, Γ ∪ θ(α, α) * θ(α, β). By Lemma 6.17, Γ ∪ θ(α, α) θ(α, β). By Reflexivity, θ(α, α). By Cut, Γ θ(α, β). Therefore, α ≡ β (mod Θ Γ C − ). By Proposition 6.11, Ω Γ C − is the most coarse-grained equivalence relation on Sent(C, P ) suitable for C − , , and Γ.
Suppose 12 is internally equivalential over C 1 and over C 2 . Let B Θ 12 be the Lindenbaum-Tarski class of juxtaposed structures for C 1 , C 2 , and 12 , built using the Θ Γ Ci relations.
Proposition 6.45. Suppose 12 is internally equivalential over C 1 and over C 2 . Then:
Proof. If 1 and 2 are consistent, then by Theorem 5.10, 12 is consistent. Claims 1-3 then follow from Proposition 6.46. Claim 4 follows from Proposition 6.39 and Theorem 5.11. §7. Classical and Intuitionist Logics. In this section, we make use of our general results about juxtaposition to investigate cases of particular interestjuxtapositions of classical and intuitionist logics.
Let P 1 = P 2 = P 12 be the countably infinite set {p 1 , p 2 , . . . }. For i = 1 and 2, let the signature C i contain the following sets of connectives:
C 12 thus contains two copies of each of the standard propositional connectives.
We say that a consequence relation, 12 , for Sent(C 12 , P 12 ) collapses just in case for every δ, δ ∈ Sent(C 12 , P 12 ) exactly alike except perhaps for some or all of their subscripts, {δ} 12 δ . We call this the "intuitionistclassical" consequence relation for Sent(C 12 , P 12 ).
7.1. Applying the Results. Let us first consider the case of bi-classical logic, the juxtaposition of two classical consequence relations. Applying the results above, we can derive several properties of cc . Given any non-trivial Boolean algebra, B, ≤ , there is a corresponding unital structure B, {1}, Φ where B is the same set of semantic values, 1 is the greatest element of the Boolean algebra, and for every a, b ∈ B:
Here, −, , and are the complement, infimum, and supremum relations on the Boolean algebra, respectively.
Let us call such structures "Boolean structures". Given a Boolean structure, the partial order of the corresponding Boolean algebra can be recovered: a ≤ b just in case Φ(→)(a, b) = 1.
The classical consequence relation is strongly determined with respect to the class of Boolean structures.
47 It is consistent, has theorems, and is left-extensional. By Theorem 5.10, cc is consistent. By Theorem 5.11, cc is strongly conservative over c 1 and c 2 . It can be axiomatized using two copies of any Hilbert-style axiomatization for classical logic. (It can also be axiomatized using two copies of any natural deduction-style axiomatization for classical logic restricted so that the rules for one stock of connectives cannot be applied within any subderivation used in the application of a meta-rule governing a connective from the other stock.) By Corollary 6.32, cc is C 1 , C 2 -strongly unital determined. We can extract additional information about cc using Proposition 6.34. The class of all Boolean structures is unital full for the classical consequence relation. We say that a juxtaposed unital structure B 1 , B 2 is a bi-Boolean structure just in case both B 1 and B 2 are Boolean structures. By Proposition 6.34, cc is strongly determined with respect to the class of all bi-Boolean structures.
The case of the bi-intuitionist consequence relation, ii is analogous. Given any non-trivial Heyting algebra, B, ≤ , there is a corresponding unital structure B, {1}, Φ where B is the same set of semantic values, 1 is the greatest element of the Heyting algebra, and for every a, b ∈ B:
Here, , , and ⇒, are the infimum, supremum, and implication relations on the Heyting algebra, and 0 is its least element.
Let us call such structures "Heyting structures". Given a Heyting structure, the partial order of the corresponding Heyting algebra can be recovered: a ≤ b just in case Φ(→)(a, b) = 1.
The intuitionist consequence relation is strongly determined with respect to the class of Heyting structures.
48 It is consistent, has theorems, and is leftextensional. By Theorem 5.10, ii is consistent. By Theorem 5.11, ii is strongly conservative over i 1 and i 2 . It can be axiomatized using two copies of any Hilbert-style axiomatization for intuitionist logic. (It can also be axiomatized using two copies of any natural deduction-style axiomatization for intuitionist logic restricted so that the rules for one stock of connectives cannot be applied within any sub-derivation used in the application of a meta-rule governing a connective from the other stock.) By Corollary 6.32, ii is C 1 , C 2 -strongly unital determined. 47 The classical consequence relation is also strongly determined with respect to the class of structures defined as above except that the set of designated values is allowed to be any proper filter on the Boolean algebra.
48 The intuitionist consequence relation is also strongly determined with respect to the class of structures defined as above except that the set of designated values is allowed to be any proper filter on the Heyting algebra.
The class of all Heyting structures is unital full for the intuitionist consequence relation. We say that a juxtaposed unital structure B 1 , B 2 is a bi-Heyting structure just in case both B 1 and B 2 are Heyting structures. By Proposition 6.34,
ii is strongly determined with respect to the class of all bi-Heyting structures. Finally, consider the intuitionist-classical consequence relation, ic . By Theorem 5.10, ic is consistent. By Theorem 5.11, ic is strongly conservative over i 1 and c 2 . It can be axiomatized by combining a Hilbert-style axiomatization for classical logic and a Hilbert-style axiomatization for intuitionist logic. (It can also be axiomatized using a copy of any natural deduction-style axiomatization for intuitionist logic and a copy of any natural deduction-style axiomatization for classical logic, each restricted so that the rules for one stock of connectives cannot be applied within any sub-derivation used in the application of a metarule governing a connective from the other stock.) By Corollary 6.32, ic is C 1 , C 2 -strongly unital determined. We say that a juxtaposed unital structure B 1 , B 2 is a Heyting-Boolean structure just in case B 1 is a Heyting structure and B 2 is a Boolean structure. Again using Proposition 6.34, ic is strongly determined with respect to the class of all Heyting-Boolean structures. The interest of these results should not be underemphasized. Juxtaposition is a natural way to combine classical and intuitionist logic.
ic has all of the entailments of intuitionist logic (for the 1-connectives) and all of the entailments of classical logic (for the 2-connectives). Indeed, it is a strong conservative extension of both intuitionist and classical logic. It obeys the usual structural rules, and is substitution invariant. Yet, the classical and intuitionist connectives are not intersubstitutable. There is no collapse.
Notice that the non-collapse result also applies to ii . This is a strictly weaker relation than ic . Thus, if corresponding connectives are not intersubstitutable in ic , they are not intersubstitutable in ii , either. What about bi-classical logic? Does this logic avoid collapse? The answer is yes, but proving this takes a bit more work. In particular, to show that cc does not collapse, we make use of Lemma 5.1 to build a coherent bi-Boolean model.
A Boolean model can be specified by specifying a Boolean algebra and a valuation. Boolean algebras can be visually represented using Hasse diagrams. Such a diagram contains nodes -each representing a distinct element of the carrier set of the algebra -and line segments connecting pairs of nodes. Given two elements of the carrier set, a and b, a ≤ b just in case there is a path from a to b monotonically increasing in height. For example, here are the Hasse diagrams for two Boolean algebras:
Let B 1 be the Boolean structure corresponding to the first of these Boolean algebras. Let B 2 be the Boolean structure corresponding to the second Boolean algebra. Let
. M 1 and M 2 designate the very same sentence symbols. By Lemma 5.1, there is a coherent juxtaposition of M 1 and M 2 . We can single out a specific coherent juxtaposition of these models by specifying which nondesignated elements to use in the construction relied upon in the proof of that lemma. (Since B 1 and B 2 are unital, there is no choice about which designated elements to use in the construction.) In particular, let a 1 = 0 1 and a 2 = 0 2 . Let M * 12 be the coherent bi-Boolean model that results from this choice in the construction.
Using this juxtaposed model, we can prove the non-collapse result. Indeed, we can prove the stronger result that no two corresponding connectives in C 12 are intersubstitutable according to cc :
Proposition 7.1. In cc , no pair of corresponding connectives are intersubstitutable. In particular:
Therefore, cc does not collapse.
Proof. Since cc is strongly sound with respect to the class of bi-Boolean structures, all we have to do is to find a coherent bi-Boolean countermodel to each putative entailment claim. We make use of the model M *
The trickiest case is the final one, since it involves an embedded connective. This is what requires us to specify a particular coherent juxtaposition of M 1 and
Since ii and ic are weaker than cc , the result applies to these logics, as well.
Notice that the two conjunction connectives, ∧ 1 and ∧ 2 , are intersubstitutable as main connectives in
ii . This is because {p Proof. Let B 1 and B 2 be the Boolean structures defined above. Let 
It follows that ii and ic are not left-extensional, either.
7.3. Interaction Rules. Our non-collapse results raise a question: Which additional axioms and rules lead to collapse when added to ii , ic , or cc ? In particular, which interaction rules -rules involving both stocks of connectiveslead to collapse?
Our general results about juxtaposition can help us to tackle this question. Many of our results do not merely to apply to the juxtaposition of 1 and 2 , but to any juxtaposed consequence relation over 1 and 2 (so long as the relevant constraints are met). Thus, we can make use of these results to help determine whether a juxtaposed consequence relation collapses. For example, we have the following nice result: Proposition 7.3. Suppose 12 is a consequence relation for Sent(C 12 , P 12 ) that extends
ii . Suppose for any α, β ∈ Sent(C 12 , P 12 ), {α → 1 β} 12 α → 2 β and {α → 2 β} 12 α → 1 β. Then 12 collapses.
Proof. {q → r, r → q} is a regular equivalence set for intuitionist logic. By Lemma 6.43, {q → i r, r → i q} is a regular internal equivalence set over C i for 12 . For any i ∈ {1, 2} and non-empty Γ ⊆ Sent(C 12 , P 12 ) consistent with respect to δ . Again using Lemma 6.2, {δ} 12 δ . Therefore, 12 collapses. Thus, if we enrich ii (or a stronger logic) with the rule that says that → 1 and → 2 are intersubstitutable as main connectives, the resulting logic collapses.
We can leverage this result to get further collapse results. In intuitionist logic, α → β is equivalent to α ↔ (α ∧ β). So it follows that if we enrich ii (or a stronger logic) with (i) the rule that says that ↔ 1 and ↔ 2 are intersubstitutable as main connectives as well as (ii) the rule that says that ∧ 1 and ∧ 2 are intersubstitutable in general, the resulting logic collapses. In intuitionist logic, α → β is also equivalent to β ↔ (α ∨ β). So if we enrich ii (or a stronger logic) with (i) the rule that says that ↔ 1 and ↔ 2 are intersubstitutable as main connectives as well as (ii) the rule that says that ∨ 1 and ∨ 2 are intersubstitutable in general, the resulting logic collapses.
We can prove additional collapse results for enrichments of bi-classical logic. For example:
Proposition 7.4. Suppose 12 is a consequence relation for Sent(C 12 , P 12 ) that extends cc . Suppose for any α, β ∈ Sent(C 12 , P 12 ), {α ∨ 1 β} 12 α ∨ 2 β and {α ∨ 2 β} 12 α ∨ 1 β. Then 12 collapses.
By Cut, {α → 1 β} 12 α → 2 β. Similarly, {α → 2 β} 12 α → 1 β. By Proposition 7.3, 12 collapses. Thus, if we enrich cc (or a stronger logic) with the rule that says that ∨ 1 and ∨ 2 are intersubstitutable as main connectives, the resulting logic collapses.
In classical logic, α → β is equivalent to ¬(α ∧ ¬β). So if we enrich cc (or a stronger logic) with (i) the rule that says that ¬ 1 and ¬ 2 are intersubstitutable in general as well as (ii) the rule that says that ∧ 1 and ∧ 2 are intersubstitutable in general, the resulting logic collapses.
We can also prove non-collapse results for enriched logics. For example:
Proposition 7.5. Suppose 12 is the least consequence relation that extends cc such that for any α, β ∈ Sent(C 12 , P 12 ), (i) {¬ 1 α} 12 ¬ 2 α and {¬ 2 α} 12 ¬ 1 α; and (ii) {α ↔ 1 β} 12 α ↔ 2 β and {α ↔ 2 β} 12 α ↔ 1 β. Then in 12 , no pair of corresponding connectives are intersubstitutable. In particular:
• {p ∨ 1 q} 12 p ∨ 2 q;
• {p → 1 q} 12 p → 2 q;
• {¬ 2 (p ↔ 1 q)} 12 ¬ 2 (p ↔ 2 q);
• {¬ 2 (p ∧ 1 q)} 12 ¬ 2 (p ∧ 2 q);
• {p ∨ 1 ¬ 1 q} 12 p ∨ 1 ¬ 2 q.
Therefore, 12 does not collapse.
Proof. We construct a coherent juxtaposed model to be a countermodel. Let B = {1, a, b, c, d , e, f, 0}. Consider the following pair of Boolean algebras on B: Let B 1 be the Boolean structure corresponding to the first of these Boolean algebras. Let B 2 be the Boolean structure corresponding to the second Boolean algebra. Let V (p 1 ) = a, V (p 2 ) = c, V (p 3 ) = f, and V (p) = 1 for every other p ∈ P 12 . Let the function [ ] be inductively defined as follows:
Here, − i , i , and i are the complement, infimum, and supremum relations on the ith Boolean algebra. 
Thus, if we enrich
cc (or a weaker logic) with the rules that say that ¬ 1 and ¬ 2 are intersubstitutable as main connectives and ↔ 1 and ↔ 2 are intersubstitutable as main connectives, the resulting logic does not collapse.
Notice that if we enrich ii (or a stronger logic) with the rules that says that ↔ 1 and ↔ 2 are intersubstitutable as main connectives, the resulting logic is leftextensional. (This is because {q ↔ i r} is a regular equivalence set over C i for
ii .
So if we enrich
ii with the rules that says that ↔ 1 and ↔ 2 are intersubstitutable as main connectives, the resulting consequence relation is regularly equivalential (simpliciter). By Proposition 6.36, any regularly equivalential consequence relation is left-extensional.) Thus, it follows from Proposition 7.5 that if we enrich cc (or a weaker logic) with left-extensionality, the resulting consequence relation does not collapse.
7.4. Weak Collapse. It is worth briefly considering a weaker kind of collapse. Let f be the bijection from Sent(C 1 , P 12 ) to Sent(C 2 , P 12 ) that maps each sentence α ∈ Sent(C 1 , P 12 ) to the sentence that results from uniformly substituting each connective in α with the corresponding connective from C 2 . We say that a consequence relation, 12 , for Sent(C 12 , P 12 ) weakly collapses just in case for every Γ ⊆ Sent(C 1 , P 12 ) and α ∈ Sent(C 1 , P 12 ), Γ 12 α just in case f (Γ) 12 f (α).
It is immediate that cc and ii weakly collapse. If 12 collapses then 12 weakly collapses. So by Proposition 7.3, if we enrich ic with the rules that say that → 1 and → 2 are intersubstitutable as main connectives, the resulting logic weakly collapses.
Since ic is a strong conservative extension over both intuitionist and classical logic, ic does not weakly collapse. Moreover, if we enrich ic with the rules that say that ¬ 1 and ¬ 2 are intersubstitutable as main connectives and ↔ 1 and ↔ 2 are intersubstitutable as main connectives, the resulting logic still does not weakly collapse:
Proposition 7.6. Suppose 12 is the least consequence relation that extends ic such that for any α, β ∈ Sent(C 12 , P 12 ), (i) {¬ 1 α} 12 ¬ 2 α and {¬ 2 α} 12 ¬ 1 α; and (ii) {α ↔ 1 β} 12 α ↔ 2 β and {α ↔ 2 β} 12 α ↔ 1 β. Then 12 does not weakly collapse.
Proof. Let B be a countably infinite set. Let 0 and 1 be elements of B. Let B 1 be a Heyting structure that is not also a Boolean structure with carrier set B and with least element 0 and greatest element 1. Let B 2 be a Boolean structure with carrier set B and with least element 0 and greatest element 1.
Let i , i , and ⇒ i be the infimum, supremum, and implication relations on the ith algebra. Let a be an element of B such that a 1 (a ⇒ 1 0) = 1. Such an element is guaranteed to exist since B 1 is not a Boolean structure. Let V be a function from P 12 to B such that V (p 1 ) = a. Let the function [ ] be defined inductively as follows:
• α → α. {α → (α ∧ β)} α → β. By Cut, Γ α → β. It follows that cc , ii , and ic do not obey Entailment Congruence. It also follows that juxtaposition does not preserve Entailment Congruence.
53 Finally, it follows that if ii (or a stronger logic) is enriched with Entailment Congruence, the resulting logic collapses. §8. Discussion. Let us return to the issues that this paper started with: What should we make of the appeal to collapse arguments in motivating philosophical theses? Should we conclude that the logical constants in our language have determinate extensions? Should we conclude that disputes in ontology are genuine disputes? Should we conclude that either intuitionism is correct and classical logic is incoherent or classical logic is correct and the intuitionists fail to recognize genuinely valid entailments?
One of the morals of this paper is that the answers to these questions are not very clear. What has emerged from the discussion above is that the success of collapse arguments, perhaps surprisingly, depends on the status of the meta-rules -including the standard natural deduction rules as well as Entailment Congruence. If we endorse classical logic (say), should we accept only the classically valid theorems and entailments or should we also accept the classical meta-rules? If we are working in a language with only the familiar logical constants, there is no way to accept the classically valid theorems and entailments without also accepting the meta-rules. But the difference looms large when we expand our language with additional vocabulary, for instance by adding a second stock of logical constants. The crux of the matter, then, seems to be this: When we expand our language, should we endorse the meta-rules as applying to the expanded language? If the answer is no, the collapse arguments are not worth very much. If the answer is yes, the collapse arguments are difficult to resist.
54
This issue is bound up with deep issues concerning the nature of logic. On one picture of the nature of logic, logic is intimately tied to reasoning. Logic is a theory of good reasoning: It captures how we ought to reason deductively. This conception of logic fits very naturally with the claim that the standard natural deduction rules are of central importance. Such rules tell us how we 53 Algebraic fibring does not preserve Entailment Congruence, either. For an example, see Zanardo et al. (2001) , page 434. 54 We might give different answers to different proposed appeals to collapse arguments.
ought to reason. 55 We should hold on to such rules no matter how we expand our language.
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On an alternative picture of the nature of logic, logic is not normative but descriptive. Logic is the theory of the logical consequence relation. It is the theory of what follows from what. 57 This conception of logic fits very naturally with the claim that what is central to logic is not the natural deduction rules but the logical truths and entailment claims. We need not hold on to the metarules as we expand our language. The role of the meta-rules is simply to encode entailments in a user-friendly way.
58
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